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DIVORCE
DIVORCE - Maintenance - Cohabitation Alone Is Insuf-
ficient Ground for Termination of Maintenance. Van Gorder
v. Van Gorder, 110 Wis. 2d 188, 327 N.W.2d 674 (1983).
In Van Gorder v. Van Gorder' the Wisconsin Supreme
Court held that a divorced person's continuous cohabitation
with another person is not alone a sufficient ground to termi-
nate maintenance payments. The court stated that mainte-
nance payments can be modified only on the basis of a
change in the financial circumstances of the parties.2 Co-
habitation is only one factor to consider in determining
whether there is a change in a recipient former spouse's
financial situation.
By so holding in Van Gorder, the court made a marked
shift from the rule it set forth in 1975 in Taake v. Taake.4 In
Taake the court revoked a cohabiting ex-spouse's mainte-
nance payments and held that a divorced spouse's cohabita-
tion with another can be acknowledged as a change of
circumstances sufficient to affect the former spouse's respon-
sibility to provide alimony.5 The Taake court specifically re-
jected the cohabiting spouse's argument that the change of
circumstances must relate only to a change in the financial
situation of the parties.6
Justice Callow7 dissented from the Van Gorder holding,
maintaining that more than just the financial situations of
the parties must be considered.8 The dissent viewed the ma-
1. 110 Wis. 2d 188, 327 N.W.2d 674 (1983).
2. Id at 195, 327 N.W.2d at 677.
3. Id at 199, 327 N.W.2d at 679.
4. 70 Wis. 2d 115, 233 N.W.2d 449 (1975).
5. Id at 121, 233 N.W.2d at 453.
6. Id at 121, 233 N.W.2d at 452-53. The dissent in Taake disputed this, stating
that "the change in circumstances that must be proved hinges upon the changed needs
or changedfinancial resources of the parties." Id at 123, 233 N.W.2d at 453 (empha-
sis added).
7. Justice Ceci joined in the dissent.
8. Van Gorder, 110 Wis. 2d at 202, 327 N.W.2d at 680. Justice Callow stated:
I read Taake to declare that it was proper for the trial court to terminate main-
tenance because of the recipient ex-spouse's continuous cohabitation with an-
other man. The dissent vigorously argued that financial need should be the
controlling factor. The majority has now moved to the position taken by the
dissenters in Taake.
Id at 202, 327 N.W.2d at 681.
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jority's result as a violation of both the spirit9 and letter 0 of
the newly reformed divorce code. The dissent also argued
that the result encourages unlawful behavior" and erodes
the institution of marriage. 12
9. Id at 204-05, 327 N.W.2d at 682. The dissent quoted the declarations of intent
as set forth by the legislature in Wis. STAT. § 765.001 (1979), which identified chap-
ters 765 to 768 as "The Family Code" and provided:
765.001 Title, intent and construction of chs. 765 to 768. (1) TITLE. Chapters
765 to 768 may be cited as "The Family Code".
(2) INTENT. It is the intent of chs. 765 to 768 topromote the stability and
best interests ofmarriage and the family. Marriage is the institution that is the
foundation of the family and of society. Its stability is basic to morality and
civilization, and of vital interest to society and the state. The consequences of
the marriage contract are more significant to society than those of other con-
tracts, and the public interest must be taken into account always. The serious-
ness of marriage makes adequate premarital counseling and education for
family living highly desirable and courses thereon are urged upon all persons
contemplating marriage. The impairment or dissolution of the marriage rela-
tion generally results in injury to the public wholly apart from the effect upon
the parties immediately concerned.
(3) CONSTRUCTION. Chapters 765 to 768 shall be liberally construed to ef-
fect the objectives of sub. (2).
Van Gorder, 110 Wis. 2d at 200-01, 327 N.W.2d at 680 (emphasis added).
10. Van Gorder, 110 Wis. 2d at 202, 327 N.W.2d at 681. The dissent stated that
the majority opinion "ignores the authority granted to trial courts by sec. 767.26(10),
Stats." Van Gorder, 110 Wis. 2d at 205, 327 N.W.2d at 682. Wis. STAT. § 767.26
(1979) provided in relevant part: "Upon every judgment of annulment, divorce or
legal separation. . . the court may grant an order requiring maintenance payments
to either party for a limited or indefinite length of time after considering: .... (10)
such other factors as the court may in each individual case determine to be relevant."
Presumably, the dissent was implying that just as the court may consider these "other
factors" in awarding maintenance, so too should it consider them when deciding
whether maintenance should be revised pursuant to WIs. STAT. § 707.32(1) (1981-
1982).
11. The fornication statute, Wis. STAT. § 944.15 (1981-1982), provides: "Who-
ever has sexual intercourse with a person not his or her spouse is guilty of a Class A
misdemeanor." The lewd and lascivious behavior statute, Wis. STAT. § 944.20 (1981-
1982), provides in part: "Whoever does any of the following is guilty of a Class A
misdemeanor:. . . . (3) Openly cohabits and associates with a person he knows is
not his spouse under circumstances that imply sexual intercourse." See also Fineman,
Law and Changing Patterns of Behaviour: Sanctions on Non-Marital Cohabitation,
1981 Wis. L. REv. 275, 278-315 (extensive analysis of the interpretation and applica-
tion of these and other statutes).
12. Van Gorder, I10 Wis. 2d at 204, 327 N.W.2d at 682. The dissent stated:
The beauty of marriage is tarnished if it is to be a financial trap. The majority
opinion in this case discourages marriage. A first marriage will be avoided
because of the possibility of permanent financial obligation for maintenance if
the marriage fails. A second marriage will be avoided because it would termi-
nate the maintenance awarded at the time of the termination of the first
marriage.
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
After seventeen years of marriage, Edwin and Shirley
Van Gorder divorced in 1971. As part of their divorce ac-
tion the parties executed an agreement which, among other
things, obligated Mr. Van Gorder to pay maintenance of
$700 per month to Mrs. Van Gorder.' 3 No time limit or cut-
off date was established for these payments. Following the
divorce, Mr. Van Gorder made all required maintenance
payments until April of 1981. In April he stopped paying
maintenance and filed a motion to amend the divorce judg-
ment. He supported his motion by an affidavit which stated
that his former wife was living in a "de facto marital rela-
tionship" and was supporting her male companion with
maintenance payments made by Mr. Van Gorder.' 4
At the hearing on the motion, Mrs. Van Gorder stipu-
lated on the record that she had cohabited continuously with
Melvin Brenner since September 1, 1979. On that date Mr.
Brenner moved into Mrs. Van Gorder's apartment. They
each testified that their respective budgets during cohabita-
tion remained virtually identical to their precohabitation
budgets. The one exception was that while Mrs. Van Gorder
continued to pay the entire rental fee of $286 per month on
her apartment, Mr. Brenner lived rent free.' 5
The trial court found that Mrs. Van Gorder had "en-
gaged in continuous cohabitation with a man"' 6 outside of
marriage and
[t]hat the manner and extent of said cohabitation in-
cluding, but not limited to, the fact the man with whom
plaintiff is cohabiting has the ability to contribute to the
support of the plaintiff, is a sufficient change of circum-
stances to affect the defendant's responsibility to provide
alimony for plaintiff's support.'7
Id. at 204, 327 N.W.2d at 205.
13. Van Gorder v. Van Gorder, 110 Wis. 2d 188, 191, 327 N.W.2d 674, 675 (1983).
14. Id. at 191, 327 N.W.2d at 675-76.
15. Id at 191-92, 327 N.W.2d at 676. The court stated: "Mr. Brenner and Mrs.
Van Gorder had agreed before they began cohabiting that Mr. Brenner would pay no
rent so that he could set aside some money to pay for the education of two of his
children now attending college." Id at 192-93, 327 N.W.2d at 676.
16. Id at 190, 327 N.W.2d at 675.
17. Id Note that this is substantially the holding in Taake v. Taake, 70 Wis. 2d
115, 121-22, 233 N.W.2d 449, 453 (1975).
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The court then ordered Mr. Van Gorder relieved of his obli-
gation to pay maintenance to Mrs. Van Gorder. 18
Mrs. Van Gorder appealed and the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals certified the case to the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
The supreme court reversed, finding that the trial court had
abused its discretion. 19 The case was remanded to the trial
court for further proceedings consistent with the court's
opinion.
II. COHABITATION AND THE WISCONSIN DIVORCE CODE
Cohabiting couples represent a growing minority.20 One
attraction of this lifestyle is the informality with which it can
be carried out. Cohabitation can begin without a marriage
license and can end without a divorce decree. 21 But, as the
Van Gorder case clearly shows, cohabiting couples are not
entirely unaffected by the legal system and its formalities.22
Increasing incidents of cohabitation coupled with a
growing divorce rate23 present a problem when a mainte-
nance receiving spouse enters into a postdivorce relation-
ship. If this relationship culminates in remarriage, as would
have been almost certain twenty years ago, the obligation of
18. Van Gorder, 110 Wis 2d at 190, 327 N.W.2d at 675.
19. Id at 199, 327 N.W.2d at 680.
20. One source estimated that between six and eight million Americans were co-
habiting in 1976. See Glendon, Marriage and the State: The Withering Away of Mar-
riage, 62 VA. L. REV. 663, 686 (1976). See also Fineman, supra note 11, at 275 n.l
("From 1960 to 1970, the number of cohabitors increased eightfold.") (citing U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION, PER-
SONS By FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS, Table 11 at 4B; id 1960 CENSUS, Table 15 at
4B); Folberg & Buren, Domestic Partnershp: A Proposalfor Dividing the Property of
Unmarried Families, 12 WILLAMETTE L.J 453,453-60 (1976) (discussion of increasing
acceptability of cohabitation).
21. But see Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815
(1976) (discussing legal rights and liabilities of cohabiting couples to each other). See
generally Comment, Marvin v. Marvin: Five Years Later, 65 MARQ. L. REV. 389
(1982).
22. For further discussion of the legal ramifications of cohabitation, see G.
DOUTHWAITE, UNMARRIED COUPLES AND THE LAW (1979); T. IHARA & R. WARNER,
THE LIVING TOGETHER KIT (1978); M. KING, COHABITING HANDBOOK (1975); N.
LAVORI, LIVING TOGETHER, MARRIED OR SINGLE: YOUR LEGAL RIGHTS (1976); C.
MASSEY & R. WARNER, SEX, LIVING TOGETHER AND THE LAW (1974); E. VAN
DUESEN, CONTRACT COHABITATION: AN ALTERNATIVE TO MARRIAGE (1974).
23. Divorce.4merican Style, Newsweek, Jan. 10, 1983, at 42, 45 (stating that in the
1980's there is one divorce for every two marriages).
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the ex-spouse to provide maintenance would end.24 But to-
day the courts are facing a new problem: what becomes of a
spouse's obligation to provide maintenance when the recipi-
ent ex-spouse enters into a relationship involving
cohabitation?
Years ago the answer to this problem would have been
obvious:
[I]f the wife, without the fault of the husband and without
any adequate excuse of palliation, deliberately chooses a
life of shame and dishonor . . . the court may make the
misconduct of the wife the ground for cutting off all ali-
mony, or for reducing the same . . . [T]he courts of our
state do not permit vice to flaunt its banner before them
unchallenged. 2
For many years, Wisconsin case law26 and statutes2 7 recog-
nized marital misconduct as being a major factor in the de-
termination of whether maintenance should be granted or
terminated. During these years Wisconsin adhered to the
"fault" concept of divorce.28
The emphasis and purpose of the Wisconsin divorce stat-
utes shifted in 1977 with the passage of the Divorce Reform
Act.29 The purpose of the Act is in part "to move away from
assigning blame for a marriage failure. ' 30 The current prop-
erty division statute is evidence of this shift in that it empow-
ers a court to divide property based upon a number of
factors but "without regard to marital misconduct. ' 3' A pri-
mary purpose of the reformed statutes is to give attention
and consideration to the respective financial situations of the
parties. This purpose is expressed in both the property divi-
24. WIS. STAT. § 767.32(3) (1981-1982) (termination of maintenance upon the
payee's remarriage).
25. Weber v Weber, 153 Wis. 132, 138, 140 N.W. 1052, 1055 (1913).
26. Haritos v. Haritos, 185 Wis. 459,464, 202 N.W. 181, 183 (1925) ("Upon proof
of adulterous conduct subsequent to the judgment of divorce, it is appropriate that the
court take into consideration such conduct in continuing or disallowing alimony.").
27. Wis. STAT. § 247.26 (1975), repealed by Divorce Reform Act, ch. 105, § 42,
1977 Wis. Laws 560, 572, provided in part: "[N]o alimony shall be granted to a party
guilty of adultery not condoned. .... "
28. See, e.g., Greco v. Greco, 73 Wis. 2d 220, 243 N.W.2d 465 (1976) (cruel and
inhuman treatment); Freeman v. Freeman, 31 Wis. 235 (1872) (adultery).
29. Ch. 105, 1977 Wis. Laws 560.
30. Id § I(1).
31. Wis. STAT. § 767.255 (1981-1982).
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sion32 and maintenance payments33 statutes. It is also sup-
ported by existing case law. 4
This shift in emphasis appears to limit a Wisconsin
court's consideration of the maintenance receiving spouse's
postmarital misconduct. The majority decision in Van Gor-
der analyzed the situation and came to a result consistent
with the spirit of the reformed divorce code.3 5 But the Van
Gorder dissent raised a number of strong arguments which
the majority opinion failed to meet.3 6 The remainder of this
note will discuss how other jurisdictions have handled the
situation, state and analyze the Van Gorder majority and dis-
senting opinions and propose an alternative means to deal
with similar future situations.
III. TREATMENT OF COHABITATION IN OTHER
JURISDICTIONS
A. Legislative Response
A number of states have passed maintenance statutes
which deal with cohabiting spouses.3 7 The statutes of Cali-
fornia,38 New York39 and Illinois40 constitute a representa-
32. Id (The 13 factors the statute gives the courts to use in determining how
property is to be divided emphasize the financial aspects.).
33. Id § 767.26 (The 10 factors the statute gives the courts to use in determining
how maintenance is to be awarded emphasize the financial aspects).
34. See Thies v. MacDonald, 51 Wis. 2d 296, 302, 187 N.W.2d 186, 189 (1971),
where the court stated: "The court's power to modify the provisions of the judgment
of divorce is ... to adapt the decree to some distinct and definite change in the
financial circumstances of the parties. . . . " (emphasis added).
35. Van Gorder v. Van Gorder, 110 Wis. 2d 188, 195-96, 327 N.W.2d 674, 678
(1983). The court quoted the Legislative Council Notes to the Divorce Reform Act,
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.26 at 210 (Supp. 1981): "The Divorce Reform Act requires
the court to consider each parent's 'earning capacity' and 'total economic circum-
stances' in deciding whether a change of circumstances has occurred." Van Gorder,
110 Wis. 2d at 195-96, 327 N.W.2d at 678.
36. See infra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
37. For further discussion of these cohabitation statutes, see Oldham, Cohabita-
tion by an Alimony Recipient Revisited, 20 J. FAM. L. 615, 644-49 (1981-1982) [herein-
after cited as Oldham, Cohabitation]; Oldham, The Effect of Unmarried Cohabitation
by a Former Spouse upon His or Her Right to Continue to Receive Alimony, 17 J. FAM.
L. 249, 256-61 (1978-1979) [hereinafter cited as Oldham, Effect of Unmarried Cohabi-
tation]; Wadlington, Sexual Relations after Separation or Divorce: The New Morality
and the OldandNew Divorce Laws, 63 VA. L. REV. 249, 268-69 (1977); Comment, The
Effect of Third Party Cohabitation on Alimony Payments, 15 TULSA L.J. 772, 780-89
(1980); Annot., 98 A.L.R.3d 453 (1980).
38. See infra note 41.
39. See infra note 48.
40. See infra note 53.
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tive sample of these statutes. Each statute is different; each
has a distinct focus and emphasis.
The California statute4' focuses on the financial situation
of the cohabiting spouse. Maintenance continues as long as
the ex-spouse shows a financial need. But upon evidence of
cohabitation, the statute creates a rebuttable presumption
that the maintenance recipient's support needs have de-
creased. The cohabiting spouse bears the burden of proving
that his or her support needs have not diminished.
The California Court of Appeal applied the statute in
Leib v. Leib .42 In Leib the former wife was living with an-
other man while receiving maintenance from her ex-hus-
band. The ex-husband moved the court to have his support
obligations terminated. Although the trial court denied the
motion, the appellate court reversed and ordered the motion
granted, holding that the ex-wife had no right to give away
her domestic services and then collect spousal support from
her former husband in an amount sufficient to enable her to
make a gift of such services.43 The court of appeal stated that
the ex-wife created a status of apparent continuing need for
maintenance by giving away these services.44 The court con-
cluded that Mrs. Leib's evidence was insufficient to over-
come the presumption of decreased need.
In Thweatt v. Thweatt45 the California Court of Appeal
held the cohabitation statute inapplicable when the ex-wife
41. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801.5 (West Supp. 1981) provides in part:
(a) Except as otherwise agreed to by the parties in writing, there shall be a
rebuttable presumption, affecting the burden of proof, of decreased need for
support if the supported party is cohabiting with a person of the opposite sex.
Upon such a finding of changed circumstances, the court may modify the pay-
ment of support as provided for in [the maintenance statute].
(b) Holding oneself out to be the husband or wife of the person with whom
one is cohabiting is not necessary to constitute cohabitation as the term is used
in this section.
42. 80 Cal. App. 3d 629, 145 Cal. Rptr. 763 (1978). See also Oldham, Effect of
Unmarried Cohabitation, supra note 37, at 257-60 (further analysis of Leib).
43. Leib, 80 Cal. App. 3d at 642, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 770.
44. Id at 643, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 771. But see In re Marriage of Sasson, 129 Cal.
App. 3d 140, 180 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1982) (statute is inapplicable to cohabiting ex-wife
when parties had previously agreed that spousal support was not to be modified upon
any ground).
45. 96 Cal. App. 3d 530, 157 Cal. Rptr. 826 (1979).
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was boarding with two men. In Thweatt there was no evi-
dence of a sexual relationship, a romantic involvement or a
homemaker-companion relationship between either of the
men and the ex-wife.46 The court's analysis centered on the
meaning of "cohabitation" as used in the California statute.
Interpreting the legislature's intent in using that word, the
court stated that it was not enough to show that the recipient
spouse and the person of the opposite sex "were merely shar-
ing living accomodations." 47 Thus, it found the statute inap-
plicable and the rebuttable presumption inoperative.
The New York cohabitation statute48 provides for main-
tenance termination upon the satisfaction of a two-pronged
test: (1) the maintenance recipient lives with a member of
the opposite sex, and (2) the two people hold themselves out
as husband and wife. Unlike the California statute, the New
York statute does not consider the financial situation of the
cohabiting ex-spouse. Instead, the statute looks to the reali-
ties of the relationship and requires a "holding out" as hus-
band and wife. In effect, New York gives recognition to de
facto marriages.49
This two-pronged test was not met in Northrup v. Nor-
thrup 50 In Northrup the New York Court of Appeals denied
a former husband's request that his support obligations to
his ex-spouse be terminated. At the time, the ex-wife was
cohabiting with another man. The court, finding no evi-
dence as to the second prong of the statutory test, stated that
an absence of proof does not justify an inference that cohab-
46. Id at 534, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 829.
47. Id at 535, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 829.
48. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 248 (McKinney 1977) provides in part:
The court in its discretion upon application of the husband on notice, upon
proof that the wife is habitually living with another man and holding herself
out as his wife, although not married to such man, may modify such final
judgment and any orders made with respect thereto by annulling the provi-
sions of such final judgment or orders or of both, directing payment of money
for the support of such wife.
49. See Oldham, Effect of Unmarried Cohabitation, supra note 37, at 260-65 (dis-
cussion of the "holding out" requirement). See also H. FOSTER & D. FREED, LAW
AND THE FAMILY: ECONOMIC ASPECTS, CUSTODY, TAXES § 26:19 (Vol. 2 Supp. 1982)
(additional New York cases interpreting the statute).
50. 43 N.Y.2d 566, 373 N.E.2d 1221, 402 N.Y.S.2d 997 (1978). See also Note,
Alimony Modyfcation: Cohabitation of Ex-Wfe with Another Man, 7 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 471 (1978-79) (additional analysis of Northrup and the New York statute).
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itation alone manifests a holding out.51 It specifically re-
jected the idea that the "lifestyles" of the cohabiting parties
could constitute a holding out.52
The Illinois statute53 provides for the termination of
maintenance upon the showing that the recipient is cohab-
iting with another person on a continuing conjugal basis.
The statute makes no mention of financial considerations,
nor does it require a holding out. It can be most accurately
described as a "morals" statute.
The Appellate Court of Illinois found the statute applica-
ble in Haiford v. Halford.54 In terminating maintenance, the
Illinois court focused on the continuing nature of the wife's
cohabitation and emphasized the conjugal nature of the rela-
tionship. The continuing basis requirement was met in that
the couple had lived together for over three years. The
couple's admission to several instances of sexual intimacy,
together with substantial circumstantial evidence of an inti-
mate relationship, was a major factor in the court's determi-
nation that the relationship was of a conjugal nature.
In Bramson v. Bramson5 6 the Appellate Court of Illinois
found that an ex-wife's cohabitation was conjugal in nature.
The court held the statute inapplicable, however, because
the cohabitation was not continuous. The couple lived to-
gether for only four months, and the former wife's testimony
that the living arrangement was temporary was
uncontroverted. 57
51. Northrup, 43 N.Y.2d at 571, 373 N.E.2d at 1223, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 999.
52. Id at 571, 373 N.E.2d at 1224, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 999 (citing with disapproval
In re Anonymous, 90 Misc. 2d 801, 804, 395 N.Y.S.2d 1000, 1002 (N.Y. Fam. Ct.
1977)).
53. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 510(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-1983) provides:
"Unless otherwise agreed by the parties in a written separation agreement set forth in
the judgment or otherwise approved by the court, the obligation to pay future mainte-
nance is terminated. . . if the party receiving maintenance, cohabits with another
person or a resident, continuing conjugal basis."
54. 70 III. App. 3d 609, 388 N.E.2d 1131 (1979).
55. Id at _ 388 N.E.2d at 1135. See also Jarett v. Jarett, 78 IUI. 2d 337, 400
N.E.2d 421 (1979) (Illinois Supreme Court established a presumption that a change in
child custody was warranted where custodial parent was engaged in open cohabita-
tion), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980).
56. 83 Ill. App. 3d 657, 404 N.E.2d 469 (1980).
57. Id at _, 404 N.E.2d at 473.
19831
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
B. Judicial Response
Judicial response in states without cohabitation statutes
can be categorized in a similar way as the response from
states having cohabitation statutes.58 The majority view em-
phasizes the recipient's financial circumstances5 9 while a mi-
nority of states apply a moral standard in determining
whether or not maintenance should be terminated.60
Economic need is the emphasis of the test set forth by the
Superior Court of New Jersey in Garlinger v. Garlinger.61 In
Garlinger the ex-wife's boyfriend moved into her home. The
boyfriend contributed nothing toward the support of Mrs.
Garlinger. Mrs. Garlinger's former husband argued that the
illicit relationship was sufficient to negate his obligation to
provide maintenance. The court noted that the minority po-
sition in such a situation is that a former wife's postdivorce
immoral conduct is enough to justify a modification or ter-
mination of maintenance payments. It rejected the minor-
ity's view as being based on distinctly punitive grounds.62
Instead, the court held that the subsequent unchastity of the
wife is not by itself cause for terminating or reducing her
maintenance.63 The court stated that cohabitation is a factor
for consideration only to the extent it may bear upon the
amount of and the necessity for the allowance.
In Mertens v. Mertens64 the Minnesota Supreme Court
set aside a trial court order which had terminated an ex-
wife's maintenance payments. The trial court's order pri-
marily focused on the fact of the ex-wife's cohabitation with
58. For further discussion of these nonstatutory state cases, see Oldham, Cohabi-
tation, supra note 37, at 649-51; Oldham, Effect of Unmarried Cohabitation, supra
note 37, at 254-55; Comment, supra note 37, at 777-80; Note, Proof of Former Wife's
Unchastity as a Factor in a Proceeding to Modify an Alimony.Award Based upon Agree-
ment of the Parties, 8 U. TOL. L. REv. 783 (1977); Annot., 98 A.L.R.3d 453 (1980).
59. Oldham, Effect of Unmarried Cohabitation, supra note 37, at 254. See also
Garlinger v. Garlinger, 137 N.J. Super. 56, _., 347 A.2d 799, 801 (1975) (cases follow-
ing the majority or minority rule).
60. Oldham, Effect of Unmarried Cohabitation, supra note 37, at 254. See also
Garlinger v. Garlinger, 137 N.J. Super. 56, _, 347 A.2d 799, 801 (1975) (cases follow-
ing the majority or minority rule).
61. 137 N.J. Super. 56, 347 A.2d 799 (1975).
62. Id at -, 347 A.2d at 802.
63. Id at . 347 A.2d at 803.
64. 285 N.W.2d 490 (Minn. 1979).
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another man. The supreme court held that cohabitation
alone was insufficient reason to terminate the maintenance. 65
It stated that cohabitation was only a factor insofar as it im-
proved an ex-spouse's economic well-being.
In McRae v. McRae66 the Mississippi Supreme Court re-
vealed early in its opinion the moral undertones of its analy-
sis by framing the issue as what effect, if any, the postmarital
adultery of a former wife has upon her right to continued
maintenance from her former husband.67 After her divorce,
the ex-wife in McRae cohabited with a man for just over one
year. The cohabitation ended when the former husband
filed a petition praying for a termination of his maintenance
obligations.68 The supreme court held that the trial court was
correct in stating that the ex-wife "forfeited her right to fu-
ture alimony the same as if she had been married to him." 69
The court disclosed the reasons for its order permanently
terminating the husband's support obligations by stating:
We are of the further view that her abode with the man for
more than a year, openly living in adultery, enduring the
embarrassment of it, and, in addition by silence, setting
that kind of example before her daughters constituted a
material change in the circumstances of the parties and
that, by her unconscionable conduct, she forfeited her right
to future alimony by her repudiation of the right thereto.7°
IV. THE VAN GORDER OPINIONS
A. The Majority
Writing for the majority, Justice Steinmetz first discussed
the limitations and justifications of maintenance in Wiscon-
sin. Maintenance "'is designed to maintain a party at an
appropriate standard of living. . . until [that] party...
has reached a level of income where maintenance is no
longer necessary.' ",71 Its justification arises from the obliga-
tion of a former spouse to support the other spouse in the
65. Id at 491.
66. 381 So. 2d 1052 (Miss. 1980).
67. Id at 1053.
68. Id
69. Id at 1056.
70. Id at 1055.
71. Van Gorder v. Van Gorder, 110 Wis. 2d 188, 193, 327 N.W.2d 674, 676
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manner to which that spouse was accustomed during the
marriage.72 The court noted that maintenance payments
may be revised after judgment.73 After stating that such a
revision could be prompted only by a change in the recipi-
ent's circumstances, the court used both case law74 and the
Legislative Council Notes to the 1977 Divorce Reform Act 75
to support its proposition that this change in circumstances
must relate to a change in the parties' financial
circumstances.
The court also analyzed its decision in Taake v. Taake,76
a case of first impression in Wisconsin. In Taake the recipi-
ent spouse was cohabiting with another man. The trial court
terminated Mrs. Taake's maintenance payments in part be-
cause it found that she was living in a "de facto marriage
relationship." 77  The supreme court affirmed, finding that
this was a sufficient change in circumstances to support the
trial court's decision.78 Neither court in Taake argued that
the change in circumstances must relate to the parties'
finances, although the supreme court noted that Mrs. Taake
and the third party had arrangements for mutual support.
In Van Gorder, however, the court maintained that Mr. Van
Gorder misinterpreted Taake when he asserted that cohabi-
tation alone is a sufficient change of circumstances to justify
a termination of maintenance payments. 79 The court reiter-
(1983) (quoting Vander Perren v. Vander Perren, 105 Wis. 2d 219, 230, 313 N.W.2d
813, 818 (1982)).
72. Van Gorder, 110 Wis. 2d at 193, 327 N.W.2d at 677 (citing Jordan v. Jordan,
44 Wis. 2d 471, 475, 171 N.W.2d 385, 388 (1969)).
73. Van Gorder, 110 Wis. 2d at 194, 327 N.W.2d at 677. See WIs. STAT.
§ 767.32(1) (1981-1982).
74. Theis v. MacDonald, 51 Wis. 2d 296, 302, 187 N.W.2d 186, 189 (1971). See
supra note 34.
75. See supra note 35.
76. 70 Wis. 2d 115, 233 N.W.2d 449 (1975).
77. Id at 118, 233 N.W.2d at 45 1. Note that Wisconsin abolished common-law
marriage in 1917. Van Schaick v. Van Schaick, 256 Wis. 214, 216, 40 N.W.2d 588,
589 (1949). But for judicial recognition of de facto marriages, see State ex rel.
Susedik v. Knutson, 52 Wis. 2d 593, 191 N.W.2d 23 (1971) (length of cohabitation
coupled with representations made during the period of cohabitation served to bar
raising of statute of limitations in paternity action).
78. Taake, 70 Wis. 2d at 122, 233 N.W.2d at 453.
79. Van Gorder, 110 Wis. 2d at 197, 327 N.W.2d at 678. For further criticism of
the court's analysis of Taake, see infra text accompanying notes 91-96.
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ated that the change in circumstances must be a financial
one.
The supreme court advised trial courts to look closely at
cohabitation arrangements. It warned that cohabitors
should not be able to fashion their relationship and finances
in a manner that is intended solely to prevent the modifica-
tion of maintenance payments.80 In conclusion, the court
dismissed as incredible the dissent's argument that the deci-
sion will discourage future initial marriages.8' It also held
the criminal code provisions inapplicable because the legis-
lature had not referenced them into the Family Code. 2
Chief Justice Beilfuss, the author of the Taake opinion,
concurred with the majority's result in Van Gorder. 3 He
also read Taake as holding that cohabitation alone is insuffi-
cient to justify a termination of maintenance payments. 4
B. The Dissent
Justice Callow dissented, 5 vigorously attacking both the
reasoning and result of the majority opinion. He viewed the
majority opinion as opening the door to potential abuse. To
prevent this abuse, he maintained that the court must con-
sider more than just the parties' financial circumstances.8 6
To support this contention he cited both the language of the
maintenance statute and the legislature's intent in passing
the reformed Family Code.87 He maintained that these au-
thorities empower a court to look beyond finances in deter-
mining whether a party's maintenance should be terminated.
Justice Callow pointed out that cohabitation violates
80. Van Gorder, 110 Wis. 2d at 197, 327 N.W.2d at 678-79.
81. Id at 198-99, 327 N.W.2d at 679.
82. Id at 199, 327 N.W.2d at 679.
83. Id at 199, 327 N.W.2d at 680 (Beilfuss, J., concurring).
84. Id at 200, 327 N.W.2d at 680.
85. Id (Callow, J., dissenting).
86. Id Justice Callow's approach would require termination of the former
spouse's legal obligation to provide maintenance. This seems to assume that the third
party acquires an obligation to contribute to the expenses of cohabitation. This result
would raise the issue of whether either cohabitor could seek palimony from the other
if this relationship ends. See Comment, supra note 21.
87. See supra notes 9-10.
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Wisconsin criminal statutes.8 8 He viewed the majority opin-
ion as rewarding illegal behavior. He also analyzed Taake,
and, taking issue with the majority's interpretation of that
case, saw Van Gorder as overruling it.89 Justice Callow con-
cluded that marriage and morality are the losers under Van
Gorder, stating that a first marriage will be avoided because
of the possibility of a permanent financial obligation for
maintenance if the marriage fails, and a second marriage
will be avoided because it would terminate the maintenance
awarded at the time the first marriage ended.90
V. CRITIQUE
None of the Van Gorder opinions used the Taake case
correctly. The Van Gorder majority and concurring opin-
ions denied Taake held that cohabitation by itself can con-
stitute a sufficient change of circumstances justifying a
termination of maintenance payments. But their denial con-
tradicts a plain reading of the case. In support of its holding,
the Taake court cited and quoted extensively from two ear-
lier Wisconsin cases that gave consideration to the revision
of maintenance based upon subsequent misconduct of the
divorced spouse.9' The trial court's decision, which the
supreme court affirmed, was in fact based upon the wife's
"misconduct. 92 The Van Gorder court's denial of Taake's
88. Van Gorder, 110 Wis. 2d at 201, 327 N.W.2d at 680 (Callow, J., dissenting).
See supra note 11.
89. Van Gorder, 110 Wis. 2d at 201-03, 327 N.W.2d at 680 (Callow, J.,
dissenting).
90. Id at 203-04, 327 N.W.2d at 681-82. The accuracy of this statement is sup-
ported by the Van Gorder trial record:
With respect to the financial arrangement, Mrs. Van Gorder's comment that it
was not unfair for her to live with someone and accept alimony because her
financial needs were unaffected, combined with Mr. Brenner's statement that
he was not considering marriage because it would jeopardize Mrs. Van Gor-
der's financial security, namely alimony, clearly indicate they have designed
their relationship for the specific purpose of enjoying a marital type relation-
ship while avoiding the termination of alimony.
Brief for Respondent at 6-7, Van Gorder v. Van Gorder, 110 Wis. 2d 188, 327
N.W.2d 674 (1983).
91. See Haritos v. Haritos, 185 Wis. 459, 202 N.W. 181 (1925); Weber v. Weber,
153 Wis. 132, 140 N.W. 1052 (1913). See also supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
92. Taake v. Taake, 70 Wis. 2d 115, 118, 233 N.W.2d 449, 451 (1975). The
supreme court, citing Weber and Haritos for support, stated: "The trial court also
concluded that Mrs. Taake's legal misconduct was the kind of misconduct which this
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holding contradicts Taake's universal interpretation. Taake
is widely cited in cases, 93 statutes94 and scholarly essays95 for
the proposition that cohabitation, with nothing more, is suffi-
cient to terminate maintenance. It is almost as if the court
could not bring itself to admit that the Taake decision was
based upon moral grounds.
The dissent also misused the Taake decision. Although
the dissent correctly stated the Taake holding, it failed to
place the case in its proper context. Taake arose in 1975.
The Family Code was not reformed until 1977. Prior to the
reform, Wisconsin adhered to the fault concept of divorce,
and the courts considered marital misconduct of either party
as a maintenance factor.96 The Taake court correctly ap-
plied those statutes. Thus, the Van Gorder dissent's reliance
on the Taake holding was misplaced. Taake interpreted
statutes which were later repealed by the Divorce Reform
Act; Van Gorder interpreted the reformed statutes.
court has heretofore recognized as warranting a change or elimination of alimony."
(emphasis added). Indicative of the trial court's emphasis on fault was its statement
in a memorandum decision that "[d]efendant has been living in sin... for some
time in the past. She plans to continue living in sin .... This gross misconduct
ought to deprive defendant of alimony from plaintiff at present and at all times in the
future." Brief of Appellant at App. 104, Taake v. Taake, 70 Wis. 2d 115, 233 N.W.2d
449 (1975). The supreme court considered other factors, such as custody being trans-
ferred to the ex-husband, but it, too, focused on the ex-wife's "misconduct." Taake,
70 Wis. 2d at 121-22, 233 N.W.2d at 453.
93. See, e.g., Alibrando v. Alibrando, 375 A.2d 9, 13 (D.C. 1977); Mitchell v.
Mitchell, 418 A.2d 1140, 1142 (Me. 1980) (disapproving Taake); Litwack v. Litwack,
289 Pa. Super. 405, _ 433 A.2d 514, 516 (1981) (Taake cited as not applicable);
Myhre v. Myhre, 296 N.W.2d 905, 908 (S.D. 1980) (disapproving Taake). But see
Kestly v. Kestly, No. 81-2216, slip op. at 8 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 1982, unpublished,
limited precedential opinion), where the court stated: "Taake requires only that the
moving party show the ex-spouse has entered into such a marriage-like relationship
that he or she might be receiving some financial benefit from a third party." In Kestiy
the ex-husband motioned the court to terminate his former wife's maintenance award
on the ground that she was cohabiting with a man in a marriage-like relationship.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's holding that there was no substantial
change in circumstances which would justify a reduction or termination of the stipu-
lated maintenance payments.
94. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 510(b) historical and practice notes
(Smith-Hurd 1980).
95. See, e.g., Oldham, Cohabitation, supra note 37, at 622 n.21; Oldham, Effect of
Unmarried Cohabitation, supra note 37, at 254 n.21; Note, supra note 58, at 787. But
see Annot., 98 A.L.R.3d 453 (1980) (categorizing Wisconsin as being among those
states which require something more than just cohabitation).
96. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
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The majority also failed in its analysis of the criminal
statutes. The court dismissed the statutes as being inapplica-
ble because the legislature did not reference them into the
Family Code.97 This explanation fails to meet the argument
that a divorce court is a court of equity. By violating the
laws of the state, a cohabiting ex-spouse is not entering the
court with "clean hands"; thus, a court of equity could deny
relief to the cohabitor.98
In addition, the majority did not attempt to rebut the dis-
sent's argument that the Van Gorder result will serve to dis-
courage an ex-spouse who is receiving maintenance from
remarrying. A maintenance recipient's remarriage termi-
nates his or her support payments.99 A maintenance recipi-
ent's careful cohabitation may not. Van Gorder may in fact
discourage remarriage. The recipient has little to lose and
much to gain by cohabiting. Fear of criminal prosecution is
minimal; the statutes are rarely enforced. 00 Proof of cohabi-
tation and what constitutes incidents of it may also be diffi-
cult. And, as Van Gorder clearly shows, cohabitation is not
enough. The supporting ex-spouse must prove the former
spouse's financial needs have changed. A cohabiting
couple's careful manipulating of their financial arrangement
could make this proof very difficult.
VI. CONCLUSION
The newly reformed Family Code emphasizes the
financial aspects of divorce and abolishes fault as a consider-
ation. The purpose of maintenance is not to punish,' 0' but
97. Van Gorder v. Van Gorder, 110 Wis. 2d 188, 199, 327 N.W.2d 674, 679(1983).
98. See generally Martinson v. Brooks Equip. Leasing, Inc., 36 Wis. 2d 209, 223,
152 N.W.2d 849, 856 (1967) (one seeking equitable relief must have clean hands). But
see Souzzo v. Souzzo, 16 N.J. Misc. 475, -, 1 A.2d 930, 932 (1938), where the court
stated:
Nor is the petitioner's right to alimony defeated by invoking the doctrine of
"unclean hands." Equity does not repel all sinners .... Petitioner was ab-
solved from all marital obligation to defendant by her decree for absolute di-
vorce. Save as a member of the public she owed him no duty to lead a
virtuous life.
99. Wis. STAT. § 767.32(3) (1981-1982).
100. See Fineman, supra note 11, at 285-98 (results of empirical study pertaining
to prosecutors' enforcement of the cohabitation statute).
101. See, e.g., Foreggerv. Foregger, 48 Wis. 2d 512, 527-28, 180 N.W.2d 578, 586
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rather to support and rehabilitate a divorced spouse.10 2
These purposes are properly embodied in the Wisconsin
maintenance statute. 0 3 The Wisconsin Supreme Court ac-
curately applied these statutes in Van Gorder v. Van Corder.
The Van Gorder decision, consistent with the Wisconsin di-
vorce statutes, emphasizes the financial situation of the par-
ties and gives no recognition to concepts of fault or
misconduct. But although the decision and its reasoning are
based on sound legal grounds, the actual result may violate
public policy. It is one thing to assert that the public's
morals have changed and that cohabitation is acceptable; it
is entirely another thing to state that the public's morals
have changed to the extent that it is acceptable for an ex-
spouse to cohabit at the expense of a former spouse. °4
The legislature should consider passing a statute to deal
with the problem. A statute modeled after the California
statute10 5 would be consistent with Wisconsin law in that its
primary emphasis is the financial circumstances of the par-
ties. By shifting the burden of proof so that the cohabiting
spouse must convince the court of no change in financial cir-
cumstances, the proof difficulties discussed above are eased.
The statute presents a middle ground; it emphasizes the
financial requirements necessary for maintenance modifica-
tion and neither discourages second marriages nor encour-
ages illegal conduct.
JOSEPH R. WALL
(1970); Tonjes v. Tonjes, 24 Wis. 2d 120, 126, 128 N.W.2d 446, 450 (1964) (alimony
should not be awarded or adjusted for punitive purposes).
102. Section 1(2) of the Divorce Reform Act, ch. 105, 1977 Wis. Laws 560, sets
forth the legislative purpose:
It is the intent of the legislature that a spouse who has been handicapped so-
cially or economically by his or her contributions to a marriage shall be com-
pensated for such contributions at the termination of the marriage, insofar as
this is possible, and may receive additional education where necessary to per-
mit the spouse to become self-supporting at a standard of living reasonably
comparable to that enjoyed during the marriage.
103. Wis. STAT. § 767.26 (1981-1982).
104. See, e.g., Boyd, Court's Cohabitation Decision Strikes Sparks, Milwaukee
Sentinel, Jan. 7, 1983, at 8, col. I (informal poll conducted in Milwaukee on day
following Van Gorder decision reveals negative views of result).
105. See supra note 41.
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